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고려-몽골 관계사 연구 시각의 검토-고려-몽골 관계사에 대한 공시적, 통시적 접근-
이익주 한국중세사학회 2009 한국중세사연구 Vol.0 No.27
By historians, the latter half of the 13th century, and the early half of the 14th, are usually referred to as the era in which the Koreans suffered Yuan empire’s intervention in Goryeo dynasty’s governing. Yuan empire allowed(or agreed to) the existence of the Goryeo state, so in order to acknowledge such fact, the term ‘intervention’ would be more appropriate than other words such as ‘ruling’ or ‘occupation’. Yet the nature of such term ‘intervention’ should be examined further, in terms of the relationship that was achieved between the Goryeo dynasty and the Yuan empire. In order to do that, in this article such relationship is viewed from both a historical view, and a periodic view. Most of the studies of the Goryeo-Mongol relationship have acknowledged the fact that Goryeo managed to retain a rather unique and even peculiar status inside the Mongol imperial order. It was basically because Goryeo was able to maintain its existence as a dynasty even in the face of the Mongolian empire, and what enabled Goryeo to do so had already been in place since the days when Goryeo negotiated peace with the Mongol troops. Because Goryeo continued to be a sovereign state, the relationship between Goryeo and Mongol should be construed as a relationship between sovereign states. And in that regard, I find it difficult to agree with either the old opinions that viewed Goryeo as a mere part(the Jeongdong Haengseong provincial government) of the Yuan empire, or the rather recent ones that view Goryeo as only a ‘feudal’ realm bestowed to the son-in-law of the Yuan emperor. Yet the matter of explaining the relationship between Goryeo and Mongol as an international one leaves one more issue to be addressed, and that is whether it would be possible to consider such relationship as a general form of a traditional tributary-appointment relationship that had always existed between Korea and China. And that issue is directly related to another cause, which urges us to review our past perspective that considered the history of Mongol as a mere part of a larger Chinese history, and not as its own. But at the same time, the ‘Yuan’ empire that was established by Emperor Qubilai featured distinct characteristics of a Chinese realm that we can easily recognize, and we should also remember the fact that the Goryeo people in the past always recognized their relationship with ‘Yuan’ as a traditional tributary-appointment relationship. So, we can say that the Goryeo-Mongol relationship was based upon a tributary-appointment relationship(which needed Goryeo to sustain its sovereign status), with a variation composed of periodic interventions which took the form of either marital engagements between the royal families of both states or Yuan’s blatant intervention in Goryeo politics. Some people might question the validity of recognizing the Goryeo-Mongol relationship as a traditional tributary-appointment relationship when there were also a variety of incidents reported in which Goryeo’s independence was either breached or damaged by Yuan’s initiatives. So in this article, other relationships between Korea and China that are now generally believed to have been tributary-appointment relationships, such as the Goguryeo-North Wi relationship of the 5th century, Silla-Dang relationship of the 7th and 8th centuries, Goryeo-Khitan relationship in the 10th and 11th centuries, and Joseon-Qing relationship of the 17th century, are examined to provide references. The results show that although tributary-appointment relationships displayed a wide range of diversity by cases, it should suffice to label a relationship so, when there were tributary actions and appointment procedures involved. We can define a tributary-appointment relationship as a relationship formed between (sovereign) states, which both realized and recognized the unequal nature of their relationship, and exchanged tributes and appointments with each other. And... By historians, the latter half of the 13th century, and the early half of the 14th, are usually referred to as the era in which the Koreans suffered Yuan empire’s intervention in Goryeo dynasty’s governing. Yuan empire allowed(or agreed to) the existence of the Goryeo state, so in order to acknowledge such fact, the term ‘intervention’ would be more appropriate than other words such as ‘ruling’ or ‘occupation’. Yet the nature of such term ‘intervention’ should be examined further, in terms of the relationship that was achieved between the Goryeo dynasty and the Yuan empire. In order to do that, in this article such relationship is viewed from both a historical view, and a periodic view. Most of the studies of the Goryeo-Mongol relationship have acknowledged the fact that Goryeo managed to retain a rather unique and even peculiar status inside the Mongol imperial order. It was basically because Goryeo was able to maintain its existence as a dynasty even in the face of the Mongolian empire, and what enabled Goryeo to do so had already been in place since the days when Goryeo negotiated peace with the Mongol troops. Because Goryeo continued to be a sovereign state, the relationship between Goryeo and Mongol should be construed as a relationship between sovereign states. And in that regard, I find it difficult to agree with either the old opinions that viewed Goryeo as a mere part(the Jeongdong Haengseong provincial government) of the Yuan empire, or the rather recent ones that view Goryeo as only a ‘feudal’ realm bestowed to the son-in-law of the Yuan emperor. Yet the matter of explaining the relationship between Goryeo and Mongol as an international one leaves one more issue to be addressed, and that is whether it would be possible to consider such relationship as a general form of a traditional tributary-appointment relationship that had always existed between Korea and China. And that issue is directly related to another cause, which urges us to review our past perspective that considered the history of Mongol as a mere part of a larger Chinese history, and not as its own. But at the same time, the ‘Yuan’ empire that was established by Emperor Qubilai featured distinct characteristics of a Chinese realm that we can easily recognize, and we should also remember the fact that the Goryeo people in the past always recognized their relationship with ‘Yuan’ as a traditional tributary-appointment relationship. So, we can say that the Goryeo-Mongol relationship was based upon a tributary-appointment relationship(which needed Goryeo to sustain its sovereign status), with a variation composed of periodic interventions which took the form of either marital engagements between the royal families of both states or Yuan’s blatant intervention in Goryeo politics. Some people might question the validity of recognizing the Goryeo-Mongol relationship as a traditional tributary-appointment relationship when there were also a variety of incidents reported in which Goryeo’s independence was either breached or damaged by Yuan’s initiatives. So in this article, other relationships between Korea and China that are now generally believed to have been tributary-appointment relationships, such as the Goguryeo-North Wi relationship of the 5th century, Silla-Dang relationship of the 7th and 8th centuries, Goryeo-Khitan relationship in the 10th and 11th centuries, and Joseon-Qing relationship of the 17th century, are examined to provide references. The results show that although tributary-appointment relationships displayed a wide range of diversity by cases, it should suffice to label a relationship so, when there were tributary actions and appointment procedures involved. We can define a tributary-appointment relationship as a relationship formed between (sovereign) states, which both realized and recognized the unequal nature of their relationship, and exchanged tributes and appointments with each other. And by ...
제4회(第4回) 환황해(環黃海) 한중교섭사(韓中交涉史) 연구(硏究) 삼포지엄 : 14세기 후반 동아시아 국제질서의 변화와 고려-원,명-일본 관계
이익주 ( Ik Joo Lee ) 진단학회 2012 진단학보 Vol.- No.114
In the late 14th century, there were historically important changes in three countries of East Asia; Korea, China, Japan. Regime changes occurred from Yuan(元) to Ming(明) in China, from Goryeo to Joseon in Korea, and the Muromachi-bakuhu unified the North and South Dynasties in Japan. With such changes in each country, the Mongolian- oriented world order which had lasted for 100 years collapsed and then a brand-new Ming-oriented order was established. Based on such East Asian order, the changes in Korea-China-Japan have a common thing in line with reorganization of the late 14th century. This writing is to analyze the change in mutual relationships among the three countries in East Asia based on the change in the world order in the late 14th century. Especially, it is about half a century relationship between Goryeo and Yuan-Ming and between Goryeo-Joseon and Japan; from 1356 when Anti-Yuan movement occurred in Goryeo; through regime change from Yuan to Ming, establishment of Joseon, unification of North and South Dynasties in Japan; to 1404 when the diplomatic relationship between Joseon and Muromachi-bakuhu was established. It is not, however, covering the relationship between Yuan-Ming and Japan, which is very critical within East Asian relationship. At the time of Yuan-Ming regime change, Goryeo succeeded to break away from Yuan`s interference through a radical Anti-Yuan movement. However, Goryeo did not deny the tributary-appointment relationship with Yuan and stayed in the Yuan-oriented East Asian order. Goryeo finally settled it in 1396, a year after Ming occupied Yuan`s capital, and then accepted the new Ming-oriented order by concluding a tributary-appointment. But actually the change from Yuan to Ming was completed in 1388 with collapse of North Yuan. After that Goryeo and Ming collided once over a case of Cheollyeong-Ui(鐵嶺衛) and then established a stable relationship, completing an axis of East Asian international order. Meanwhile, separated from Yuan and Goryeo, Japan was totally isolated from the Mongol-oriented world order in the 13-14th century. In the late 1350, Japanese pirates(倭 寇) appeared and attacked Goryeo and Yuan. It was a result of relaxation in Yuan-oriented order, and at the same time, they destroyed the order. Because of the Japanese pirates, Goryeo newly recognized the needs of negotiation with Japan; in 1366, they sent envoys to Japan to resume diplomatic relations. After Goryeo made a tributary-appointment relationship with Ming in 1369, Japan got appointment from Ming in 1371, forming the Ming-oriented East Asian order. However, the new order had a weakness that the government who was appointed was not the Muromachi-bakuhu; this problem was solved in 1392, when Muromachi-bakuhu unified North and South Japan and was proclaimed the King of Japan in 1404. The establishment of new tributary-appointment relationship between Ming and Japan means completion of another axis of the order; diplomatic relationship between Joseon and Japan was made soon, and finally, a new East Asian world order including Joseon, Ming, and Japan was completed. The mutual relationship between international history and national history lets us think about a limitation in history of foreign affairs which has been familiar to us. History of foreign affairs makes it difficult to structurally understand international order and to set multiple relationships, and to avoid the danger of subjective interpretation. To solve such problems, we need a method of studying history of international relationships based on structural understandings. Premodern international relationship including Korea also generally includes China and Japan. It might be a definite format of premodern history of international relationship to synthetically study mutual relationships among three countries in East Asia.
「광개토왕릉비」에 나타난 고구려의 대중인식(對中認識)과 대외정책
여호규 한국역사연구회 2005 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.55
In the 5th century, Koguryo established an independent power block of its own and with itself at the center, but at the same time the dynasty also maintained a Tributary/Assignment relationship with the Chinese dynasties. These two concepts, an independent version of perception of the world, and the admitted status of a subordinate, 'assigned' state of a relatively more formidable entity, seem contradictory at first glance. And because of that seemingly contradictory nature of Koguryo's own foreign relationships, past studies generally tended to choose either side of those relationships and reviewed the foreign policy of the Koguryo dynasty on that basis. But those two sides of Koguryo's foreign relationships and policies, should be considered altogether, in order to acquire an appropriate understanding of the matter. In this article, a section of letters from the Mausoleum tablet of King Gwanggaeto-wang, the documents mentioning the historical facts of the 5th year of the Yeongrak/永樂 era to be particular, were examined. As a result, this researcher was able to theorize that in order to establish an alleged independent realm with itself at the core, Koguryo dynasty was indeed hesitant in officially and openly acknowledging its tributary/assignment relationship with the Chinese dynasties, but at the same time it also decided to maintain such relationship just in order to bring its own realm of power to reality. Based upon a dual-natured perception of China, the Koguryo dynasty employed a foreign policy in which it maintained the tributary/assignment relationship with China, and at the same time also established an independent power block in the Eastern regions of East Asia. This kind of perception of China, and a set of foreign policies based upon that perception, were established in the mid-4th century. Koguryo was simply employing a foreign policy that was designed to stabilize the Northwest border area by establishing a tributary/assignment relationship with the Chinese dynasties, and also to found an independent power block in the Eastern regions of East Asia. This policy was based upon Koguryo people's understanding of the international situation at the time, which was becoming increasingly plural and multi-layered(a relatively new concept in the region) in the post-4th century era. And in the early days of the 5th century, Koguryo managed to expand its realm to the middle and Northern areas of the Korean peninsula and also the Manchulia region, and the Koguryo people finally found themselves in an independent realm of their own.
이현주 동국대학교 신라문화연구소 2020 신라문화 Vol.55 No.-
This study examines Background and the meaning of Appointment titles received by the king and queen of Shilla in the 7th and 8th centuries. The war and diplomacy in East Asia in the 7th century were the result of conflicting interests of East Asian countries. After the Natang War (羅唐戰爭), the Tang Dynasty's strategy on the Korean Peninsula was shifted. Changes in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula in the 7th century, and changes in the foreign policy of the Tang Dynasty, later influenced the Shilla-Tang relationship (羅唐關係). Since the royal family of the Shilla Kingdom ascended to the throne as a true skeleton, it needed a justification and system maintenance to strengthen the royal authority. The need to strengthen the royal authority of the Shilla Kingdom and overhaul the system were an internal conditions to maintain a friendly, lush relationship. In addition, during the reign of King Seongdeok (聖德王), the accession of Tang's Hyeonjong (唐玄宗), the founding and attack of the Balhae (渤海) were external conditions under which the friendly relations between the Tang Dynasty and Shilla were established. Since King Seongdeok (聖德王), the Shilla-Tang relationship (羅唐關係) has been stable. This kind of relationship between the two countries was developed in connection with the internal and external situations of Shilla In other words, the Tributary Appointment Relationship (朝貢冊封關係) between the Tang and Shilla was a political act based on the interests of the two countries. King Seongdeok dispatched a total of 46 Tang temples over the 36 years of his reign, which were diplomatic envoys, intermediates in public trade and channels for cultural exchanges. King Seongdeok wanted to strengthen the Tang's external friendly relations through the dispatch of Tang officials, and to accept the Tang's institutions and cultural properties to overhaul the system and strengthen the royal authority internally. Since King Seongdeok's reign, the Shilla-Tang relationship (羅唐關係) have become closer, and this is why Shilla's royal women's Appointment title is performed in addition to the Shilla king's. The Shilla accepted the Installation System (冊立體系) from the Tang and applied it to upper-class women, namely royal women and aristocratic women. The queen and the queen were established, and in cases where they were demoted from royal women to aristocratic women due to their departure, or the reward of aristocratic women, they were bound with a servant's articles corresponding to their status and their heritage. As such, the royal family has institutionalized the difference in status between royal women and aristocratic women. Through this, we wanted to raise the authority of the royal family and strengthen the royal authority. In the middle of the Shilla Dynasty, there were two cases in which the Tang dynasty took up not only the Shilla king but also the royal woman of Shilla. One is the Queen of King Hyoseong (孝成王妃), and the other is Queen mother of King Hyekong (惠恭王大妃) of Shilla. The Tang's seizure of the Shilla's queen was unusual compared to the neighboring countries. The Tang's establishment of the Shilla queen and the queen mother was internally caused by political opposition between the royal family and the aristocracy. Also externally, it was due to the solid Shilla-Tang relationship (羅唐關係) between the post-king Sungduk and the weakening of the Tang's ruling power within. This led to Shilla's request for the royal woman’s Installation title (冊立號) and the acceptance of the Tang dynasty.
이명미(Lee, Myung mi) 한국사연구회 2013 한국사연구 Vol.162 No.-
Even after the fall of the Choi House’s Military regime in 1258, Goryeo king was without full control of the military, politics and government officials. And after the peace appointment with Mongol in 1259, Goryeo leaders assumed that the relationship with the Mongols would be no different from the ones that the Goryeo had with other Chinese-based dynasties, which is tributary-appointment relationship. In that relationship, the emperor would not interfere in Goryeo affairs. In this condition, Im yeon(林衍, ?~1270) dethroned the sitting king Won-jong(元宗, 1259~1274) in 1269. The Mongols, who assumed that the relationship with Goryeo was similar to subjection relationship in their experience, accepted the dethronement as a rebellion against the Mongol emperor, intervened actively and reinstated Won-jong. Through this process, the power structure of Mongol Subjugation period was established. In this power structure, the king with the Mongol emperor’s power and authority became the sole center of Goryeo governance once again. With the change, however, the emperor’s authority that had been valid almost only in diplomatic terms before became to have actual power ‘in’ Goryeo, and the Goryeo kings’ status as vassals of the emperor also became practical ‘in’ Goryeo. In the power structure with the Mongol emperor’s authority on top, the power went along with the relations and the stability and closeness of the relations with the Mongol emperor and the imperial family. Now the Goryeo kings had to make efforts to intensify their personal and familial ties with the Mongols, and used those ties to maintain their kingship and the control over the government.
한승훈 고려대학교 아세아문제연구원 2024 亞細亞硏究 Vol.67 No.1
In this paper, I analyze the study of Korea’s foreign relations in the late 19th century in the West in the 1930s. Specifically, I will focus on Francis Clifford Jones (Jones, F. C.)’s “Foreign diplomacy in Korea 1866-1894” (PhD. in Harvard University, 1935) and Kiernan, E. V. G.’s British Diplomacy in China 1880 to 1885 (Cambridge University Press, 1939). In particular, in this paper, I would like to examine how Jones and Kiernan describe the process by which Britain perceived the Korea-Qing Tributary Relationship in the early 1880s and applied it to policy formulation. Jones and Kiernan’s basic position is that Britain did not deny the Korea-Qing Tributary Relationship. However, they also emphasized the fact that Britain did not unconditionally rely on Qing policy toward Korea, which was based on the Korea-Qing Tributary Relationship. In response, Kiernan revealed that Britain’s basic position was that Korea’s independence and treaty with the Great Powers would help prevent Russian expansion southward. Kiernan explained that the British occupation of Geomundo(Port Hamilton) was a response to British concerns about Russian advances on the border between Russia and Qing China or in Afghanistan at the time. Jones’s view is that the British occupation of Geomundo(Port Hamilton) was not motivated by a secret agreement between Korea and Russia, but rather by the British- Russian conflict in Afghanistan. Jones’s view is in line with Korean research that suggests that the British considered seizing Geomundo(Port Hamilton) after the Gaksin Revolution, and that the British did so as the conflict with Russia in Afghanistan escalated. However, it is still accepted as orthodoxy in Korean high school history textbooks that Korea pursued a secret agreement with Russia to exclude Qing interference after the uprising, and that the British, upon hearing the news, seized Geomundo(Port Hamilton) to neutralize the secret agreement between Korea and Russia. 본 논문은 1930년대 서구에서 진행된 19세기 후반 조선의 대외관계 연구를 분석하고자 한다. 구체적으로는 1935년 미국 하버드대학교의 박사논문인 존스(Francis Clifford Jones; Jones, F.C.)의 “Foreign diplomacy in Korea 1866-1894”(PhD. in Harvard University)와 1939년 영국 케임브리지대학교 출판부에서 펴낸 키어넌(Kiernan, E.V.G.)의 British Diplomacy in China 1880 to 1885 (Cambridge University Press, 1939)를 다루고자 한다. 특히 본 논문에서는 존스와 키어넌이 1880년대 초반 영국이 조선과 청국의 관계를 인식하고 이를 정책 수립에 적용한 일련의 과정을 어떻게 서술했는가에 초점을 맞추었다. 존스와 키어넌은 기본적으로 영국이 조선과 청국의 “속방”관계를 부정하지 않았다는 입장을 견지하였다. 하지만 그들은 영국이 조선과 청국의 “속방”관계에 입각한 청국의 대조선정책에 무조건적으로 의지하지도 않았다는 사실 또한 강조하였다. 이에 키어넌은 조선의 독립과 열강과의 조약 체결이 러시아의 남하를 막는 데에 도움이 된다는 것이 영국의 기본 입장이었다는 사실을 밝혔다. 키어넌은 영국의 거문도 점령이 당시 러청 국경, 또는 아프가니스탄에서 러시아 진출을 우려한 영국의 조치로 설명하였다. 존스는 영국이 거문도를 점령한 원인이 조러밀약에 있지 않았으며, 영국과 러시아의 아프가니스탄 갈등에서 비롯되었다는 견해를 제시하였다. 존스의 견해는 갑신정변 이후 영국이 거문도 점령을 고려했으며, 그 와중에 아프가니스탄에서 러시아와의 갈등이 증폭되자 영국이 거문도 점령을 단행했다는 한국 측 연구와 조응하였다. 하지만 여전히 한국의 고등학교 한국사 교과서에서는 갑신정변 이후 조선이 청의 간섭을 배제하기 위해서 러시아와의 밀약을 추진했으며, 그 소식을 접한 영국이 조러밀약을 무력화하기 위해서 거문도를 점령했다는 것이 정설처럼 받아들여지고 있다.
曺永憲(Cho, Young-Hun) 동양사학회 2017 東洋史學硏究 Vol.140 No.-
This article mainly deals with 15<SUP>th</SUP> century’s sino-korean relations based on recent research as a founding stone for comprehensive reexamination of sino-korean relationship from 15<SUP>th</SUP> century to 19th century. In the beginning of 15<SUP>th</SUP> century, going through the chaotic and turbulent period of the latter of 14<SUP>th</SUP> century, so called ‘Ming Order’ which had functioned as a basic framework for Ming-Choson relationship was established. The sino-korean relationship was very closely linked with China(Yuan and Ming)’s external policy and international change of relationships, so the extent of this relation’s change around 1400 was an unprecedented level. Therefore we have no choice but to pay attention to international relationships in which China played a central role first in order to fully understand Korea-China relations during 15<SUP>th</SUP> century. For this purpose, this article at first described the wholistic big picture of East Asian world. Second, I try to embody the detail of sino-korean relationship which was constantly connected with international relations. At last, I manage to reshape the sino-korean relations through several and comprehensive perspectives of korea-japan relations and sino-japan relations. Ming china exercised her political influence mainly through the ritual protocol toward neighboring countries such as Korea, Annam, which was totally different way of method with Mongol’s world order or Yuan system. At the same time, influential Ming emperors, especially Hongwu and Yongle, reestablished traditional, powerful, and monistic tributary system. This system conveys the idea, “Hua-yi yi jia”, which means that northern Yi(barbarian) and southern Hua(Chinese people) were unified as one family. This idea was completely the legacy of Yuan experience. Given such continuity and change of east asian history, ‘special relationship’ rather than ‘typical relationship’ should be more suited for describing the 15<SUP>th</SUP> century sino-korean relations as they were.
Hunchun, the Qing-Chosŏn Borderland in the Eighteenth Century
김선민 고려대학교 한국사연구소 2016 International Journal of Korean History Vol.21 No.1
Based on a murder which emerged near Hunchun in 1749, this study analyzes the varied and complex nature of the Qing-Chosŏn relationship. The local residents residing along the border, local officials guarding the border between both countries, and the Qing emperor and Chosŏn king were all involved in this murder in which Qing subjects were killed by Chosŏn people along the Tumen River. However, this incident was differently perceived in the Tumen River area, Hunchun, Beijing and Seoul, depending on the positions of those who were involved with. The Qing emperor in Beijing and Chosŏn king in Seoul saw the Tumen and Yalu Rivers as an implement to ensure the authority of the suzerain court and the loyalty of tributary court. The control of borders and punishment of trespassers were important elements of the power of the Qing emperor and Chosŏn king. For the residents of this area, the Tumen River area was a trading space in which articles could be purchased based on contacts; meanwhile, for local officials, it was an area in which close cooperation with the officials from the adjacent country was needed in order to implement the orders of the central government. For local residents and officials, the Tumen River was as such a detailed and physical space rather than an abstract and political line. Rather than a space in which the will of the central power was unilaterally conveyed and penetrated, the borderland known as the Tumen River and Hunchun was a space in which various classes of people expressed and negotiated their desires.

고구려와 중국의 초기 使臣往來 기사 분석-漢・魏・吳를 중심으로-
박승범 신라사학회 2018 신라사학보 Vol.0 No.44
The historical records of Goguryo and Han・Cao Wei, Sun Wu suggest that the following; 1. Goguryo and Han had 23 contacts, mainly in Xuantu Commandery. Goguryo and Han wanted to carry out its interests through war rather than diplomatic efforts, irrespective of the tributary appointment relationship. 2. There were 14 contacts between Goguryo and Cao Wei・Sun Wu. Goguryo was more active than Cao Wei, but Sun-Wu was more active than Goguryo. 3. The intention of Goguryo to advance into Xuantu Commandery was made possible by Goguryo taking the initiative. 4. The contact between Sun Wu and Goguryo was not realized by containment of Cao Wei. During this process, the envoys of both countries were either interned or killed. It can be seen that the international situation in East Asia during this period was very urgent. 5. Goguryo's official rank of dispatched envoys were at least Jowue(皁衣). Considering that the rank of Sun Wu's an official rank of envoys was at least 5~6, it is very low. It was an inevitable step taken by Goguryo that navigation skills and maritime information were low. On the other hand, the receipt of diplomatic documents was handled by Jubu(主簿) of the king's aides. It shows that Goguryo recognized the importance of foreign policy toward China. 6. Goguryeo has been in long-standing diplomatic contact with China since its founding, and diplomatic documentary administration took place at the earliest of the second century. 고구려와 후한 시기부터 曹魏와 孫吳 등 중국 세력의 사신왕래 기록을 통해 다음과 같은 사항들을 확인할 수 있었다. 첫째, 고구려와 한나라는 군현을 중심으로 총 23차례의 접촉이 있었다. 후한과의 사신왕래는 조공-책봉체제와 무관하게 양측이 자국의 이익을 외교적 노력보다는 전쟁을 통해 관철하고자 하였다. 둘째, 魏吳와 고구려 사이에는 모두 14회의 접촉이 있었다. 조위보다는 고구려가 보다 적극적이었으나, 손오의 경우 고구려보다 더 적극적이었다. 셋째, 현도군 방향으로 진출하려는 고구려의 의도는 고구려가 주도권을 갖게 됨으로써 가능하였다. 넷째, 손오와 고구려의 접촉은 조위의 견제로 실현되지 못했다. 이 과정에서 양국의 사신은 억류되거나 살해되었다. 이 시기 동아시아 국제 정세가 매우 긴박했음을 알 수 있다. 다섯째, 고구려의 사신파견 관원의 관등은 최소 皁衣였다. 손오 사신의 관등이 최소 5~6등급이었다는 점을 고려하면 매우 낮은 관등이다. 항해기술이나 해양 정보가 어두웠을 고구려가 취한 불가피한 조치였다. 반면 외교문서의 수발은 近侍 관등인 主簿가 담당하였다. 고구려가 대중국 교섭의 중요성을 인지했음을 보여준다. 여섯째, 고구려는 건국 이래 중국과 오랜 외교적 접촉을 해왔으며, 외교문서행정은 늦어도 2세기 초부터 행해졌다.