문화재 보호와 재산권 보장- 문화재 보호에 관한 독일 법원의 판결을 고찰하며 -

이부하 대한변호사협회 2022 人權과 正義 : 大韓辯護士協會誌 Vol.- No.505

Property owners who own cultural properties want to make a profit and use them. In this situation, on the one hand, there is a public interest in the protection and preservation of cultural properties, and on the other hand, a conflict arises between the private interest of the property owner guaranteeing property rights. The property right is a key fundamental right in the Constitution. The guarantee of property rights guarantees the free exercise of property by the subject of basic rights, and enables the creation of property under self-responsibility. According to the constitutional provisions on the suitability of the exercise of property rights for the public welfare, the provision of laws that place the private interest over the public interest violates the provision of the guarantee of property rights under the Constitution. If the restriction of private interests restricted by the implementation of projects that require acceptance for the purpose of public welfare is not proportional, such acceptance measures do not contribute to public welfare. If the restriction of property rights is recognized as possible acceptance of property rights, this is called social binding of property rights, and in this case, there is no obligation to compensate. Exceptionally, if it violates the principle of proportionality or equality among the content and limitations of property rights and constitutes an infringement of property rights, it becomes a provision for the content of property rights obligated to compensate. The German Federation has legislative powers and can enact its own cultural heritage protection laws. According to the German Constitution, the German Federation has exclusive legislative powers for the protection of German cultural property from export. Because the Federation and the states have competing legislative powers, the states have cultural property protection laws. If the cost of preserving and managing cultural properties of the property right owners exceeds the value of profit or use from the cultural property, the property right owners will not be able to accept it. In Germany’s state cultural property protection law, it is judged by the economic acceptability to the person obligated to protect cultural properties. As a legal requirement for the protection of cultural properties, the economic acceptability should be judged from an objective point of view. In calculating the profitability of cultural properties, the income value generated from cultural properties is calculated. Tax benefits may be granted to cultural properties based on the individual property and financial situation of the property owner. In addition, the impossibility of trading cultural properties is also a criterion for determining the possibility of acceptance. In the constitutional system of Korea, exceptionally, if it violates the principle of proportionality or equality among the content and limitations of property rights and constitutes an infringement of property rights, it is a provision for the content of property rights obligated to compensate. In this case, the economic acceptability can be used as a criterion for judgment. 문화재를 소유하고 있는 재산권자는 문화재를 통해 수익을 창출하고 문화재를 이용하기를 원한다. 이러한 상황에서 한편으로는 문화재 보호와 보존이라는 공익이 존재하고, 다른 한편으로는 재산권자의 재산권 사용·수익·처분이라는 사익 간에 충돌이 발생한다. 재산권 보장은 기본권 주체의 재산의 자유로운 행사를 보장하며, 자기책임 하에 주도적으로 재산 형성을 가능하게 해 준다. 헌법에서 재산권 행사의 공공복리 적합성 조항에 의거하여, 사익을 공익보다 우위에 두는 법률조항은 헌법상 재산권 보장 조항에 위반된다. 공공복리의 목적을 위해 수용이 필요한 사업 시행으로 인해 제약을 받는 사익에 비례적이지 않는 경우, 그러한 수용조치는 공공복리에 기여하지 못하게 된다. 재산권의 제한이 재산권자의 수인가능성 범위 내로 인정되는 경우, 이를 재산권의 사회적 기속이라 하며 이 경우에 보상의무는 발생하지 않는다. 예외적인 경우에 보상의무 있는 재산권의 내용 규정에 해당하게 된다. 독일 연방은 입법권을 가지고 문화재보호법을 제정할 수 있다. 독일 연방은 독일 문화재의 국외 반출로부터 보호하기 위해 전속적 입법권을 가지고 있다. 연방과 주는 경합적 입법권을 가지고 있기 때문에 주는 문화재보호법을 제정하고 있다. 재산권자의 문화재 보존과 관리 비용이 문화재로부터의 수익이나 사용가치를 넘어서는 경우, 재산권자는 이를 수인할 수 없게 된다. 독일 주 문화재보호법에서는 문화재 보호의무자의 경제적인 수인가능성을 기준으로 판단한다. 문화재 보호에 관한 일반 법률 규정은 주(州)마다 상이하기 때문에, 재산권을 제한하는 법규정의 해석·적용에 있어서 수인가능성 여부가 심사기준이 된다. 문화재 보호에 대한 법적 요건으로서 경제적 수인가능성은 객관적인 관점에서 판단되어야 한다. 문화재의 수익성 계산에 있어서 문화재로부터 발생하는 소득가치를 계산하게 된다. 해당 재산권자의 개별 재산 및 재정 상황을 기반으로 하여, 문화재에 대한 세금 혜택을 부여할 수 있다. 또한 문화재의 매매 불가능성 여부 기준으로 수인가능성이 활용된다. 문화재를 소유한 재산권자가 수인가능하다면 사회적 기속에 해당하고, 수인할 수 없다면 보상의무 있는 재산권의 내용 규정에 해당하게 된다. 우리 법체계에서도 재산권자의 수인가능성을 기준으로 사회적 기속성 여부를 판단할 수 있다.

지식재산권의 해석 도구로서 재산권(Property)과 자연독점(Natural Monopoly) - 미국에서의 법경제학적 논의를 중심으로 -

진도왕 한국재산법학회 2013 재산법연구 Vol.29 No.4

Intellectual property rights have been developed through using the metaphor of property. This tradition of using the property metaphor has long been dominant in the field of intellectual property. Intellectual property has been recognized as a sort of property that is a right over intellectual products. When understanding intellectual property in terms of property, it is likely to reduce intellectual property to an exclusive right. An emphasis on the exclusive right alone leads to expansions of intellectual property rights through understanding intellectual property infringement in terms of the language of trespass, granting strong injunctive remedies, or extending the duration of copyrights. This paper explores whether the property metaphor properly serves as an interpretative device to understand intellectual property rights. More specifically, it focuses on whether understanding intellectual property as property covers all aspects of intellectual property. Then, it demonstrates that the metaphor of natural monopoly can be an alternative interpretive device to the property. Intellectual property as property gives rise to controversies about the scope of intellectual property rights. Understanding intellectual property as property does not provide any implication for defining the extent to which intellectual property rights should or could be protected. Rather, it may justify the maximization of exclusivity so that it ends up with the excessive protection of intellectual property rights. The excessive protection through too strong exclusivity is likely to impede enjoying innovation by blocking distribution of intellectual property in the market. At this stage, natural monopoly can be considered as an alternative interpretive device to property in the field of intellectual property. As demonstrated in the text, recasting intellectual property as natural monopoly does not so much weaken the property nature of intellectual property, but it also explains more precisely all aspects of the intellectual property, which include production, distribution and commercialization of intellectual property in the market. By doing so, it makes it possible to harmonize intellectual property with public interests, moving away from private interests. Furthermore, it provides an implication for defining the proper scope of intellectual property rights. Consequently, this movement accords with pursuing innovation as the final goal of intellectual property laws. 본고에서는 지식재산권의 발전 과정에서 가장 많이 사용되어 왔던 재산권 메타포가 지식재산권을 해석하는 도구로서 적절히 기능하는 지를 살펴본다. 좀 더 구체적으로, 재산권 메타포를 통해 지식재산권에 배타성 혹은 배타적 권리를 장착시키는 것이 지식재산권의 본질과 목적 내지는 기능 면에서 어떤 의미를 가지는지를 알아보고자 한다. 이러한 작업을 통해 재산권 메타포가 지식재산권을 설명하는 데에 유용한 해석 도구가 될 수 있는지 알 수 있을 것이다. 이러한 재산권 메타포의 사용에 대해 비판적인 입장은 지식재산권을 해석하는 도구로서 재산권 법리의 한계를 지적한다. 이 입장은 기본적으로 지식재산권법의 최종 목적이 지식재산 활용을 통한 사회․문화적 발전에 있다는 점에 주목하고, 그에 따라 지식재산권이 지나치게 배타적 권리로 축소되면 지식재산의 분배와 유통이 심각하게 제한될 수도 있음을 강조한다. 그에 따라 재산권 메타포를 대체할 수 있는 새로운 해석 도구의 필요성을 주장한다. 최근 미국의 학계에서는 자연독점(natural monopoly) 개념을 메타포로 사용하여 지식재산권을 설명하려는 입장이 있어 왔다. 후술하는 바와 같이, 자연독점 메타포는 지식재산권의 재산권성을 크게 훼손시키지 않으면서도, 동시에 지식재산권의 생산과 분배 등의 여러 측면들을 균형 있게 설명하는 해석 도구로 작동한다. 이하에서는 지식재산권에 있어서 재산권 메타포가 어떻게 전개되어 왔는지, 그리고 그러한 재산권 메타포가 지식재산권을 해석하는 도구로서 과연 적절한 것인지를 살펴보고, 이어서 재산권 메타포를 대체할 수 있는 지식재산권의 해석 도구로서 자연독점 메타포를 논의한다.

지적재산권 보호를 위한 제도개선과제의 검토 및 그에 따른 법 개정 방향

이용우(Lee Yong-Woo) 한국법학회 2004 법학연구 Vol.17 No.-

Today, the intellectual property right is becoming as diverse and complicated as changes in the Internet environment, In addition, intellectual property technology is becoming advanced at a rapid rate through the influence of the sophisticated research system and high investment in it. But it is thought that it is necessary to maintain the current system for a short period in relation to the trend of application for utility models and the protection of and support for small-and medium-sized businesses. The original purpose of the intellectual property right system is not only to encourage the desire to invent and create a new thing by heavily protecting inventors or creators through effortful contrivance but to reap the reward for efforts through the monopolistic right or the exclusive right. But if intellectual property is limited in its use and competition due to its excessive protection, it comes to run counter to the original intent and purpose of the intellectual property right system. The latter becomes one reason for shortening the period of protecting the program copyright, In addition, in case of the computer program the range of its right as the patent should be scaled down as much as possible and excluded in consideration of its characteristics and the existence of laws and regulations for its protection. It is thought that it is the best policy to streamline the procedures and costs for translating it into a right, reap the effect of maximum economic profit and provide for the legal system that can thoroughly protect it from intrusion. Out reality is not so. In summary, the current situation is that the legal system for the intellectual property right does not catch up with the need for and importance of the intellectual property right as previously mentioned. Therefore, it is thought that in relation to it, it is urgent to reorganize and provide for the legal system for a new intellectual property right that has newly been formed or will be formed, including all the problems in the Copyright Law which has been raised as the pending problem and become debated. On the one hand, people have a poor knowledge of the concept of intellectual property right, or its protection and its intrusion. Therefore, whenever the dispute over the intellectual property right occurs, it depends on litigation rather than settlement through mutual agreement, In some respect, it can be said that it is extremely normal. The patent court on litigation for intellectual property right must be the special court, In such a sense, it is thought that the concentration of jurisdiction should be achieved. Recently, it has recently been publicly argued that ADR should be applied to the settlement of the dispute over the intellectual property right. So it is thought that an examination over it should actively be made in the future. In conclusion, the protection of the intellectual property right is not unconditional protection of developers or inventors but should be premised on the given degree of contribution to national industry and cultural development in the intellectual property right, Its excessive protection of intellectual property may limit its use and dwindle free competition because of it. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that another development or creation may be made through its application. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the system related to intellectual property, taking into consideration both the private interest of the intellectual property holder and the public interest of national development.

재산분할의 본질과 재산분할청구권의 상속성

서순택 ( Seo Soon-taek ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2014 외법논집 Vol.38 No.4

The right of claim for the division of matrimonial property is the right of arranging the matrimonial property after divorce. Through the drastic reform of the Code of Family Law in 1990, it has established such right under Article 839.2. Under the Article, a divorced person by mutual agreement may claim for the division of matrimonial property against another(Section 1). However, if a divorce agreement has not been reached, the court, through the claim of either party, may determine the amount and the means of division by taking the amount of property that the parties have jointly achieved into consideration(Section 2). This right, however, ceases to exist after two years of divorce period(Section 3). Moreover, Article 839.2, as an effect of a divorce agreement, is applied in both cases of judicial divorce(Art. 843) and voidable marriage(Art. 2.1 of the Code of Household Affairs Procedure). And the Article has also been applied in cases of putative marriage by the precedents. Basing such right on the separate property system, the property of one’s own before marriage and the property acquired by one’s name are classified as a unique property under Art. 830 Sec.1. This Article removes an unreasonable outcome that has been emerged in our tradition where the property built by the cooperation of both husband and wife is mostly acquired under the name of husband and, thus, where wife’s contribution has hardly been taken into account. Moreover, the Article practically guarantees the freedom of divorce by providing for an economically incompetent spouse. Thus, the Article tends to materialize the equality of both genders by allowing the right of claim for the division of matrimonial property, irrespective of the fault of a claimant. The legal nature of such right has been roughly divided into two: liquidation theory and liquidationsupporting theory. And the liquidation-supporting theory is currently a majority opinion which understands the right of claim for the division of matrimonial property as a right that has both the eliminative nature of acquired property and the supportive nature of economically incompetent spouse. Regarding to the nature of the right of claim for the division of matrimonial property, our case law provides a number of positions which lead to some ambiguities However, some problems may arise on the discussion of inheritance of such right in both practice and theory, if a majority opinion and the court include the supportive nature as one of the elements of the right of claim for the division of matrimonial property. Our theories, by and large, have tendencies to accept inheritance in cases of a rightful person passing away before receiving the property, if either parties had agreed to divide the property or the court had determined the practical amount of such division. However, although we approve the right of inheritance in these cases, if we understand such right as not only eliminative but supportive, the value of property has to be distinguished into two natures at least. Moreover, our precedents do not make such distinction. In other words, without considering the two elements, the court only divides the property as a whole or individually according to its types in a fine ratio. Thus, it is necessary for a court to distinguish the amount in each element when the court decides that the right contains the nature of maintenance. If not, a rightful person is dead or presumed dead after the concrete scope of division property has been set up, it may be difficult to resolve the problem of inheritance. In my view, it is theoretically and practically difficult to clarify the legal nature of the right of claim for the division of matrimonial property and to determine the clear amount of such division. Hence, to relieve this situation, it is more appropriate to understand such right as the liquidation of matrimonial-property relation excluding the element of maintenance. Moreover a right which is strictly personal to the obligor in terms of its exercise is deferent from a right which is strictly personal to the obligor in terms of possession and the exercise of the former should not affect in its inheritance.

미국의 ‘신 재산’ 이론에 대한 평가와 우리 법에의 시사점

김윤홍 전남대학교 법학연구소 2018 법학논총 Vol.38 No.3

The American New Property Theory is advocated by Charles Leich and adopted in the Supreme Court of United State. Leich emphasized the importance of government benefits in modern society and the welfare system to protect the socially weak should be operated recognizing this right in public law as one of the property right. By recognizing the property right nature of welfare entitlement and applying the due process principles of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that pre-hearing procedure must be conducted should welfare benefits be stopped. The New Property Theory did not maintain the same form as in Goldberg case at the Supreme Court, and there were many criticism within the United State. At the heart of the criticism are that the judiciary replaces the authority of Congress, that there are budget constraints, and that it would rather reduce welfare by applying more rigorous procedures. In case of Korea, the Constitutional Court recognized the welfare entitlement by accepting the theories of Germany Federal Constitutional Court. However, even if the welfare entitlement has the nature of property right, it can not be regarded as having the same effect as the property rights as a free right. This can be explained in comparison with the fact that the New Property Theory does not hold the same position of property right in the United State. The possession of property enables material life, and furthermore through which the freedom of individual can be realized. Perhaps the New Property Theory in Korea, a presidential state based on the principle of strict separation of powers, will be able to work as a mechanism for the court to appropriately control the legislation of the parliament and to build a stable welfare system by giving the free right nature to this social right, a welfare right. By examining the New Property Theory in various perspectives and looking back at the evaluation, merits and demerits in the United States, this paper will explore what implications can be gained in adopting and applying the property right nature to welfare right in our country. 미국의 신 재산 이론은 찰스 라이크에 의해 주창되어 미 연방대법원 판례에 의해 채택된 이론이다. 라이크는 현대사회에서 정부급부의 중요성을 역설하며 공법상 권리를 재산권으로 인정함으로써 사회적 약자를 보호하는 복지제도가 작동하여야 한다고 하였다. 연방대법원은 복지수급권의 재산권성을 인정하고 수정 제5조 적법절차원칙을 적용함으로써 복지수혜의 중단에 사전청문절차가 반드시 행해져야 한다고 판결했다. 신 재산 이론은 연방대법원에서 골드버그 사건에서와 동일한 형태를 유지하지는 못하였고, 미국 내에도 많은 비판의 목소리가 있다. 비판의 핵심은 의회의 권한을 사법부가 대체한다는 것, 예산상의 제약이 있을 수밖에 없다는 것, 엄격한 절차를 준수하도록 함으로써 오히려 복지를 감소시킨다는 것 등이 될 수 있다. 우리나라의 경우 복지수급권은 헌법재판소가 독일 연방헌법재판소의 이론을 받아들임에 따라 일정한 요건을 갖추면 재산권성이 인정된다. 그러나 복지수급권이 재산권성을 가진다고 하여 자유권인 재산권과 동일한 효과가 발생하는 것으로 볼 수는 없다. 이 점은 미국에서 신 재산 이론이 재산권이라는 입장을 견지하지 못한 것과 비견되어 설명될 수 있을 것이다. 재산이 있음으로 말미암아 물질적 삶, 나아가 개인의 자유실현이 가능해질 수 있다. 아마도 신 재산 이론은 엄격한 권력분립의 원칙에 입각한 대통령제 국가인 우리나라에서, 사회권인 복지권에 자유권적 성격을 부여함으로써, 법원이 의회 입법에 대해 적절히 통제하고, 안정적인 복지시스템을 구축할 수 있는 기제로 작동할 수 있을 것이다. 본 논문은 신 재산 이론을 다양한 시각으로 정리하고, 미국 내에서의 평가와 공과를 되돌아보며, 우리나라에서 복지권에 재산권성을 부여하고 적용하는데 있어 어떤 시사점을 제공할 수 있는지를 탐구하고자 한다.

우리 민법의 시각에서 본 베트남의 물권제도

이준현 국민대학교 법학연구소 2024 법학논총 Vol.36 No.3

The Civil Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was enacted in 1995 and was revised twice in 2005 and 2015. Each amendment is to keep pace with Vietnam's development into a socialist market economy. This paper was written with the purpose of comparing and reviewing the property rights system of the current civil law, the 2015 Civil Code of Vietnam, and the Korean Civil Code. The property right section of the Vietnamese Civil Code has a relatively simple composition and does not adopt the term 'property right'. Land is owned by the entire people, and land ownership by individuals and corporations is strictly prohibited. Individuals and corporations can only acquire land use rights from the state for a certain period of time. Similar to land ownership, land use rights can be sold, inherited, gifted, transferred, rights established, and provided as security, but after a certain period of time, land must be returned to the state in principle. Furthermore, in the Civil Code of 1915, regulations on the right to adjacent immovable property, the usufruct right and the surface right were newly established. In addition, liens, pledges, and mortgages, which are our security rights, are not on the property rights section, but are stipulated on the obligation section as one of the measures to secure the performance of obligations. These points are different from our civil law, and should be noted in particular. There is a point to note when North Korea intends to enact its own civil law by referring to Vietnam in the future. The 1995 Civil Code of Vietnam recognized various forms of ownership, which should not be followed, and in order to establish a market transaction order, special attention should be paid to the protection of transaction safety and legal regulations to support it should be prepared. In principle, the principle of freedom of contract must be observed, and the superior status of the state in private transactions should not be recognized. It should be clarified that the state also bears the liability for damages if it fails to properly fulfill its debt or commits an illegal act. The property rights system of Vietnamese civil law is outlined in this paper. (1) In-depth research on the acquisition of property rights, the disclosure process of property rights changes, In this paper, the real right system of Vietnamese civil law is introduced in an overview. (1) In-depth research on the acquisition of real rights and the disclosure process of changes in real rights, (2) an investigation into whether lien, pledge and mortgage of property etc. are properly functioning as a means to secure the performance of obligations, (3) an in-depth study on the other security means that exist as security measures for the performance of obligations other than lien, pledge and mortgage of property, and (4) a research on the contents and detailed procedures of various registrations on land use rights and property will be additionally needed. In this regard, future plans will be promised.

무체재산권⋅지적소유권⋅지적재산권⋅지식재산권 - 한국 지재법 총칭(總稱) 변화의 연혁적⋅실증적 비판 -

박준석 서울대학교 법학연구소 2012 서울대학교 법학 Vol.53 No.4

한국에서 지적재산권법 전체를 가리키는 용어, 즉 총칭은 일제 강점기부터 지금까지 무체재산권, 지적소유권, 지적재산권, 지식재산권 순서로 계속 바뀌어 왔다. 처음 쓰인 ‘무체재산권’이란 용어는 독일에서 유래한 것으로 일제 강점기에 우리에게 강제로 이식된 것인데, 채권까지 포함하는 것 같은 혼동을 초래하여 적절치 않다. 그 다음 ‘지적소유권’이란 용어는 1986년 미국의 통상압력으로 부득이 한국 지적재산권법 전체가 가장 극적으로 변화하던 시점에 미국의 강한 영향으로 등장하였다. 1990년경 이후 특허청의 주도로 ‘지적재산권’이란 새로운 총칭이 정착되었고 이것은 지금까지 가장 널리 받아들여진 총칭이다. 그런데 2011년에 발효된 이른바 지식재산기본법은 이번에는 ‘지식재산권’이란 용어를 사용하도록 정하고 있다. ‘지적소유권’은 지적재산권의 물권적 특징을 가장 잘 드러낸 반면 미국과 달리 한국에 존재하는 전용실시권․전용사용권의 존재 등을 누락한 흠이 있다. ‘지적재산권’의 경우 그 보호대상들을 거의 빠짐없이 포섭한 반면 무형(無形)의 지적세계에서는 민법의 현실세계와 달리 물권과 대등한 채권이 존재하기 어렵다는 사실을 간과하고 있다. 이 점은 새로운 ‘지식재산권’ 용어도 마찬가지이다. 한국에서 지나치게 자주 총칭이 변경됨으로써 특히 지적재산권법 외부인들에게심각한 혼란이 발생하여 왔다는 점을 이 글은 아주 상세하게 구체적인 입법․사법에서의 오류 등을 찾아 실증적으로 살펴보았다. 무엇보다 현행 법률에 위 4가지 용어가 여기저기 흩어져 모두 존재하고 있는 것은 시정하여야 한다. 뿐만 아니라 총칭의 잦은 변경은 후학이나 다른 전공자들이 효율적으로 선행문헌을 찾는 것조차 저해하고 있다. 총칭이란 우리 지적재산권법 종사자들만의 문제가 아니라 외부인이 전체 법체계에서 지적재산권법을 식별하는 지침이다. 사회적 합의가 확고하다면 위 지적소유권․지적재산권․지식재산권 중 어느 것이라도 무방하며 앞서 본 각 용어의 비교적 사소한 흠 때문에 새로운 용어로의 변경을 허용하게 되면 불필요한 혼란으로 인한 비용이 그 이익을 쉽게 초과할 것이다. 그런 견지에서 부정경쟁방지법이 물권적 권리를 부여하지 않음을 들어 ‘지적재산권법’이 아니라 ‘지적재산법’으로 총칭변경을 하자는 일본이나 국내의 견해는 부당하다고 사료된다. 왜냐하면 권리개념에 관한 민법 일반의 원칙에 어긋나거나, 그렇지 않다면 지적재산권의 권리가 물권적 권리에 국한한다는 확고한 관행이 없었기 때문이다. 덧붙여 미국 지적재산권법에서는 ‘Intellectual Property’라고만 칭하여 굳이 권리(right)란 문구를 부가하지 않지만 한국의 민사법에서의 논리체계나 관행은 상이하므로 ‘지적재산법’이 아니라 ‘지적재산권법’이라고 칭함이 적절하다. 결론적으로 어떤 이유로든 지적재산권법의 총칭을 차후에 다시 변경하는 것은 극도로 지양하여야 한다. The generic term in Korea which is to be used for the entire intellectual property law has continuously changed in the order of Intangible Property, Intellectual Property, Intellectual Valuable Rights, Knowledge Valuable Rights since the colonial period under Japanese rule. The first term “Intangible Property” which had been originated from Germany was forcefully implanted on Korea during the Japanese rule and is not adequate because it makes a confusion easily as if it included the contractual and tortious right. The second term “Intellectual Property” emerged as the strong influence of the US when all the Korea intellectual property laws dramatically changed with no other option under the pressure linked to free trade benefit by US in 1986. Since around 1990, Korean Patent and Trademark Office led to move on to the next generic term “Intellectual Valuable Rights” which has been most widely accepted in Korea. Then the so-called Framework Act about intellectual property, which came into effective in 2011, makes mandatory using the new “Knowledge Valuable Rights” term at this time. The above term “Intellectual Property” misses the existence of a kind of limited real right system for exclusive use and etc. which exists in Korea law unlike that of US. while the term grasps exactly the characteristic of intellectual property as property. The “Intellectual Valuable Rights” overlooks the fact, unlike in the real world, the contractual and tortious rights indigenous to the intangible world which was parallel to the property right are actually hard to exist, though it embraces almost all protected subject without missing. The new term “Knowledge Valuable Rights” has the same flaw in this point. This article review that there has been a serious confusion especially to the outsiders of the intellectual property law because the generic term has been changed frequently, by presenting empirical evidences in a very detailed manner for specific legislative and judicial errors. Most of all, the inconsistency in the current statute where all the above four generic terms are still remaining valid in each own clause should be corrected. Also, too frequent changes in generic term even makes younger scholars in IP or seniors in other majors suffered from inefficiency in finding the preceding articles. The right generic term for IP is not only the concern of Korean intellectual property insiders but also the sign with which the outsiders discern the Korean IP law from other parts of the entire Korean legal system. If there is a firm social consensus, any term among Intellectual Property, Intellectual Valuable Rights and Knowledge Valuable Rights will be good and the cost will easily exceed the profit due to unnecessary chaos if we would allow the another change just because of a relatively minor blemish on the term. In that regards, the opinion in Japan or Korea which proposes the another term change from “Intellectual Valuable Rights law” to “Intellectual Valuable law” on the ground that the Unfair Competition Prevention Act does not grant any right seems unreasonable. It’s because the opinion is contradictory to the general principles about the concept of rights in civil law or there has been no solid tradition which limits the concept of right only to a kind of real right. In addition, it is more appropriate to call “Intellectual Valuable Rights law”, not “Intellectual Valuable law” because the legal logic in the Korean civil law system is different even though the intellectual property law in United States is named as just “Intellectual Property”, not “Intellectual Property Right”. In conclusion, for any reason, another change of generic term for the Korean entire intellectual property law in future should be avoided by all means.

벤처企業의 資本調達을 위한 知的財産擔保制度

韓鐵,咸哲勳,金元奎 한국기업법학회 2002 企業法硏究 Vol.9 No.-

Intellectual property right security system is thing which establish security right in debtor's intellectual property right security creditor secures own security bond. And in case debtor does not fulfil debt, creditor can receive priority payment security disposing of conversion. Problem about securitize of intellectual property was happened with venture capital at 1990. Venture business is not traditional security asset such as real estate and securities, but superior brain is property. It is not easy that intellectual property right security system evaluates intellectual property. That evaluate value of technique becomes that evaluate inflict mortgage, but much problems remain in case is evaluated by technique itself. That is, there is difference with do practical technology although evaluated inflict mortgage about technology. Value estimation of intellectual property right may have to consist with other intellectual property right may have to consist with other intellectual property right or business equipment. That is, we may have to invent method to offer material things and intellectual property right by mortgage together to evaluate value of intellectual property right. We can think put in good order so that may take current law at real concretely, and real estate security system on American law or Japan's induction of floating charge system. But, intellectual property right can not apply general fundamental of civil law just as it is because urea that is industrial policy enemy is strong. Therefore, present system can not protect rightful person who do not register. We must put in good order registration system degree so that effect of security right may reach to improved intellectual property to protect rightful person who do not register.

‘본질적으로 논쟁적인 개념’으로서 헌법상 재산권의 허와 실 ― ‘배출권’의 재산권으로서 법적 성격 및 지위와 관련하여 ―

이덕연 한국공법학회 2017 공법연구 Vol.45 No.4

Theoretical objections to emission right including moral critiques are common in public discussion. In this paper my purpose is to engage in the debate about the appropriate definition of the constitutional property right. I will argue that and why the concept of the constitutional property right should be redefined, while also trying to outline the essentials and flaws of the existing definitions which neglect the aspect of the legitimacy in the process of acquiring the property right, especially its illusionary character in the context of the reviewing their conceptual possibilities and limits with regard to taking into consideration the legal status of emission right as a property right. From this critical perspective will be provided some insights into the structural and conceptual gap between the concept and reality of the property, and its back- ground causes. The main arguments are structured in two parts. The third chapter covers three appealing issues or factors with respect to the conceptual elements used in the traditional definition of the constitutional property right: ‘private usefulness’, ‘arbitrarily disposability’, and ‘property value’. It aims to present and analyze their vacant contents called ‘meaningless meaning’ in the context of their mutual overlapping relations, which are compiled merely by the contrived regulation. The fourth chapter try to explicate that, why, and for what the constitutional property right is to be categorized and better understood as ‘an essentially con- tested concept’ defined originally by W. B. Gallie in 1956. We will elaborate on the contents and meaning involved of the seven inherent characters and conditions of ‘an essentially contested concept’. It argues that describing the constitutional property right in such terms helps to explain not only the theoretical disagreement about the concept, but its place and meaning within the conceptions and practices of the constitutional interpretation of property right. Finally, in the fifth chapter I offer a theoretical account of the three available alternatives of constitutional interpretation including legal reasoning which are to be considered in order to stipulate the legal status of the emission right as a constitutional property right, while also arguing for the most persuasive method including the dogmatics of Limited Common Properties(LCPs) and Hybrid Property etc. with suggesting some reasons, however with a major premise that no single approach is appropriate for every circumstances. ‘배출권’(emission right)의 헌법상 재산권으로서의 성격과 지위가 법적 이슈로 주목되고 있다. 일종의 ‘대기이용권’ 또는 ‘오염권’에 해당하는 ‘배출권’의 ‘상품화’(commoditising) 구상과 연계된 법제와 이에 담긴 다분히 경제적 효율성에 초점을 맞춘 시장기반의 정책 및 제도적 구상들(conceptions)을 헌법상 재산권 개념(concept)으로 포섭할 수 있는 재산권이론 및 도그마틱의 구성이 가능한지 여부에 대한 해명이 그 핵심내용이다. 그것이 가능하다고 한다면, 법형식적으로는 ‘대기’에 대한 이용권을 거래대상으로 물목화한 것이기는 하지만 실질적으로는 환경재로서 ‘대기’에 경제적 가치를 부여하는 논리적 전제 하에 구성된 ‘배출권’의 본질과 ‘거래제’의 구조의 관점에서 주목되는 난제, 즉 사유재산권에 의해 규율될 수 있는 희소한 자원이 아니고 또한 경계획정이 불가능하고, 따라서 귀속과 배타적인 지배의 가능성이 상정되기 어려운 자연자원인 ‘대기’를 법적으로 거래가능한 재화로 구성하여 ‘상품화’하는 것이 헌법상 재산권과 조화될 수 있는지 여부가 문제로 주어진다. 종래 확립된 재산권 도그마틱은 재산권의 다층적인 헌법적 의의와 복합적인 기능을 주목하면서도, 정작 그것을 제대로 수렴해내는 재산권해석론을 전개하지 못하였다. 선재하는 재산적 가치만을 주목하고, 재산권 취득 과정상의 도덕적, 윤리적 정당성과 정치경제학적 타당성은 반영하지 못하는 일종의 ‘정태적인 재산권관’에 따른 결과이다. 이에 비판적인 입장에서 보건대, 헌법상 재산권 개념은 궁극적으로 헌법적 원리와 제도에 담긴 정당성의 이념과 가치들의 연결망 속에서 정치경제학적, 가치론 및 도덕과 가치철학적 논의에서 출발하여 형성되어야 한다. 개방된 재산권이론과 연계되는 복합적인 재산권보장의 이념적 지향점과 기능적 과제의 관점에서 파악되어야 한다. 헌법상 재산권 개념의 ‘본질적으로 논쟁적인 개념’으로서 논리구조와 기능적 특성 자체가 바로 이러한 접근의 관점 및 그에 따른 방침의 타당성과 함께 그 이론적, 현실적 효용을 지지하는 유력한 근거가 된다고 보는 입장에서 Gallie가 제시한 ‘본질적으로 논쟁적인 개념’의 7가지 특성 또는 조건들을 되짚어 본다. 결론적으로 헌법상 재산권해석론의 차원에서 ‘배출권’의 재산권적 성격과 지위를 설명하기 위하여 제시된 대안 중에서는 일단 LCPs의 논증방법을 가장 적확한 것으로 평가한다.

위헌심사에 있어서 헌법 제22조 제2항의 규범적 의미

서경미 헌법재판연구원 2019 헌법재판연구 Vol.6 No.2

The Article 22 Section 2 of the Constitution does not have much research on its constitutional meaning, and the Constitutional Court does not actively apply it as a practical standard for judicial review, even though the same provisions existed from the Founding Constitution. However, The Article 22 Section 2 of the Constitution has its own constitutional meaning to guarantee intellectual property system and intellectual property rights. The Article 22 Section 2 of the Constitution also adopts a creator protection principle which basically requires that the right to creation be attributed to the creator. Depending on the specific formation of the intellectual property rights, the creator’s rights may be constituted exclusively or non-exclusively, but in order to provide creators with sufficient incentives, it is inevitable that the rights of exclusive property are set within a certain range. In addition, the creator’s right to creative work can be formed by variety of rights, such as property rights or personality rights, depending on the type and characteristics of the creation. The creativity required for the creation at the constitutional level is the minimum of creativity, which means originality that demands to be the result of one’s own creative activity, and the level of creativity is a matter of legislative policy that the legislator decides according to the kind and nature of the creation. Above all, the intellectual property system is recognized for the development of academics, arts, culture and science. Consideration should be given to ensuring that excessive protection of intellectual property rights does not lead to the detriment of academic, artistic, scientific and cultural development. Since the current intellectual property system basically recognizes the property rights, even if the Article 22 Section 2 of the Constitution do not exist, it can be fully guaranteed under the Article 23 property rights of the Constitution. This is the reason why the normative meaning of the Article 22 Section 2 is often ignored in judicial review. However, it contains the contents of independent norms such as intellectual property system, intellectual property rights protection, and creationism. Therefore, in the judicial review related to the formation or scope of intellectual property rights, it is necessary to consider the constitutional meaning of the Article 22 Section 2. 헌법 제22조 제2항은 동일한 내용의 규정이 제헌헌법부터 존재하였음에도, 헌법적 의미에 대한 연구가 많지 않았으며, 헌법재판실무에서도 지적재산 관련 법안의 헌법적 근거로만 언급되고 있을 뿐, 실질적인 위헌심사기준으로 적용되지 못하고 있다. 그러나 헌법 제22조 제2항은 제헌헌법 제정 당시부터 학문과 예술, 과학과 문화의 발전을 위하여 창작자의 창작물에 대한 권리를 보장하는 규정으로 도입되었고, 9차례의 헌법개정에서도 계속 유지되었는바, 단순히 지적재산보호를 위한 국가의 목표규정이라 볼 수 없고, 지적재산제도 및 지적재산권을 보장하는 독자적인 헌법적 의미가 있는 조항으로 보아야 한다. 헌법 제22조 제2항은 지적재산제도 및 지적재산권을 보장하는 규정으로, 원칙적으로 창작자에게 창작물에 대한 권리를 귀속시킬 것을 요구하는 창작자주의를 채택하고 있다. 입법자의 구체적인 형성에 따라 창작자의 창작물에 대한 권리는 배타적으로 또는 비배타적으로 구성될 수 있으나, 창작자들에게 충분한 창작유인을 제공하기 위해서는 일정한 범위 내에서 배타적인 성질의 권리 설정이 불가피해 보인다. 또한, 창작자의 창작물에 대한 권리는 창작물의 종류와 특성에 따라 재산권적 성질이나 인격권적 성질 등 다양한 성질의 권리로 형성될 수 있으며, 헌법적 차원에서 창작물에 대해 요구되는 창작성은 최소한의 창작성, 다른 사람의 창작활동의 결과가 아닌 자신의 창작활동의 결과일 것을 요구하는 독창성으로 보여지고, 구체적으로 요구되는 창작성의 수준은 입법자가 창작물의 종류와 성격에 따라 결정할 입법정책의 문제이다. 무엇보다도 지적재산제도는 학문과 예술, 문화와 과학의 발전을 위하여 인정된 것이므로, 그 형성에 있어 공중의 자유로운 이용 및 학문과 예술, 문화와 과학의 발전이라는 상호 보완적이면서도 상충적인 이익의 조화를 고려하여야 하고, 지적재산권에 대한 과잉한 보호로 학문과 예술, 과학과 문화의 발전이 저해되는 결과를 초래하지 않도록 하여야 한다. 현행법상의 지적재산제도는 기본적으로 지적재산권의 재산권적 성질을 인정하고 있기 때문에, 헌법 제22조 제2항이 없더라도 헌법 제23조 재산권 규정에 의하여 충분히 보장을 받을 수 있도록 되어 있어, 헌법 제22조 제2항의 독자적인 의미가 간과되기 쉬우나, 헌법 제22조 제2항은 지적재산제도 및 지적재산권 보장, 창작자주의와 같은 독자적인 규범내용을 담고 있으므로, 지적재산권의 형성이나 범위 설정과 관련된 문제에 있어서는 헌법 제22조 제2항의 독자적인 의미를 인정하여 위헌심사에 적용할 필요가 있다.