고위공직자범죄수사처 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률의 해석상의 문제점 -사건이첩요청권과 사건이첩권 및 다른 수사기관의 통보의무를 중심으로-

김현철 ( Kim¸ Hyun-cheol ) 경상대학교 법학연구소 2021 법학연구 Vol.29 No.3

In this thesis author studied the issues concerning concrete procedures of the request for a case transfer, the obligation of the investigative agency to notify the criminal facts, and a case transfer regulations, the authority of the agency to which the transfer or notification was received or which transferred or notified in the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials. And author studied whether the prosecutor of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials have the right to request forced disposition authority such as the right to request warrant etc. in relation to the status of the prosecutor under the Act on the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials and, if so, to what extent. Author presented an opinion that in relation to the requirements of a transfer request, the degree of investigation should be judged by aggregating the degree of investigation about a person involved in case, the degree of securing concrete evidence, whether a compulsory investigation is launched, and the fairness controversy should be judged by considering whether there could be a controversy over fairness in transferring a case to the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials itself taking into account the identity of the suspect and his attitude in the investigation process, as well as the behavior of investigation agency, such as human rights violations, easy-going investigations, and biased investigations, and it is not advisable to consider human and material competence in the decision to request a transfer. And it is reasonable that recognition in the obligation of the other investigative agency to notify the criminal facts of other investigative agencies should be interpreted as practically launching an investigation, not an internal investigation stage. Author presented an opinion with concrete argument that in relation to the transfer to other investigative agency, the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials can not request to transfer to the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials pursuant to Article 24 (1) of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials Act after completing the investigation in case of having the right to investigate, prosecute and maintain as well as having the right to investigate without having the right to prosecute and maintain. Author presented an opinion with concrete argument that in relation to forced disposition authority such as the right to request warrant etc. prosecutor of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials is a prosecutor who has the right to request a warrant etc. under the Criminal Procedure Act, and prosecutor of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials has the right to request warrant etc. when the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials investigate directly in all cases which the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials has the right to investigate without having the right to prosecute and maintain as well as has the right to investigate, prosecute and maintain, but not prosecutor of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials but prosecutor under the Public Prosecutors' Office Act has the right to request warrant etc. when another investigative agency investigate in all cases which the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials has the right to investigate, prosecute and maintain as well as has the right to investigate without having the right to prosecute and maintain. Meanwhile request for a case transfer by the discretion according to judgment of the head of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials is a problem because it gives room for the head of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials to select arbitrarily the case and the suspect under investigation. Author presented an opinion that in the future the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials Act needs to be revised to transfer mandatory to the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials if other investigative agency conducts a criminal investigation that overlaps with the criminal investigation of the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials, and to be revised to delete regulation which permits for the Criminal Investigation Agency for a high-ranking Public Officials to transfer to other investigative agency a case. It will be in line with the purpose of establishing a separate investigation and prosecution agency which independence and neutrality is guaranteed by the legislation of the National Assembly, the representative body of the people, to deal with high-ranking public officials' crimes.

공수처검사의 소송법적 지위와 영장청구권

오병두 한국형사법학회 2024 형사법연구 Vol.36 No.1

The Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (hereinafter referred to as the “CIO Act”) stipulated the right to indict more narrowly than that of investigation. After this, disputes may arise over regarding the legal status of the prosecutor of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (hereinafter as the “CIO prosecutor”) in cases where they lack the right to indict, specifically whether they have the authority as a ‘prosecutor’ to request a warrant as provided in Article 12, Paragraph 3 and Article 16 of the Constitution (hereinafter as “constitutional prosecutor”). Some argue that in cases where the CIO prosecutor has the right to investigate but not the right to indict, he/she may not be considered a ‘constitutional prosecutor’ and cannot request a warrant. However, the CIO is a prosecution body, and its prosecutor should be regarded as a ‘constitutional prosecutor’, because the CIO prosecutor holds the same legal status in the Criminal Procedure Act as the prosecutor of the Prosecutors' Office. (hereinafter as “PO prosecutor”). First, the Constitution designates the officer with the right to request a warrant as a ‘prosecutor’ to strengthen control over the legality of compulsory investigations by a legal expert in the prosecution body. In this respect, the CIO prosecutor is the same as the PO prosecutor, and also has the right to request warrants for investigating crimes within its jurisdiction as a ‘constitutional prosecutor’, regardless of the right to indict. Secondly, there is no distinction in the Criminal Procedure Act between the prosecutor of the CIO and the PO in terms of their legal status as a ‘prosecutor.’ For example, to ensure the suspect's rights, the detention period of the prosecutor (Articles 203 and 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act) should be also applied to the CIO prosecutor. In the event of case transfer (Article 24 of the CIO Act) between CIO and PO, the detention periods of both PO and CIO prosecutors should be combined.

고위공직자범죄수사처 검사의 영장청구권에 관한 검토

박상민 대검찰청 2021 형사법의 신동향 Vol.- No.70

The so-colled Law on the establishment and operation of High-ranking Officials Corruption Investigation Agency came into force on January 1. 2021. Now os the time to go beyond the pros and cons of the introduction of the system, and to review related issues on the premise of the specific contents of the enacted law. In particular, according to the legislation, a new institution called ‘Investigation Agency Prosecutor’ was introduced in addition to the prosecution under the existing Prosecutors’Office Act. These investigation Agency Prosecutors not only investigate the Corruption of High-ranking public officials, but also prosecute some high-ranking public officials, but also prosecute some high-ranking public officials such as juges, prosecutors, and high-ranking police officials. As this brings about a major change to the existing criminal justice system, such as prosecution monopolyism, various reviews on what is the legal nature of the investigating agency and how to grasp the status of the investigating agency in relation to the existing system. In addition, the emergence of such a ‘new’ prosecutor is expected to provide an opportunity to analyze the meaning of the existing prosecution system and the direction of its reform. In this article, I would like to review the issue of the prosecutor’s right to request a warrants based on this awareness of the problem. The Korean Constitution restricts claimants for various warrants to prosecutors. Therefore, the qeustion of the right to request warrants by the prosecutors at the investigation agency is a question of whether the newly established prosecutors at the instigation agency are included within the scope of prosecutors prescribed by the Constitution. The conclusions on this matter will depend on the purpose of the Constitution granting prosecutors the right to request warrants and the legal nature of the investigating prosecutor. 이른바 공수처법이 2021년 1월 1일 시행되었다. 이제는 제도 도입 자체의 찬반론을 넘어, 제정된 법률의 구체적 내용을 전제로 관련 쟁점들을 검토해 나가는 것이 필요한 시점이라고 생각된다. 특히, 공수처법 제정에 따라 기존 검찰청법에 의한 검사 외에 ‘공수처검사’라는 새로운 기관이 도입되었고, 이러한 공수처검사는 고위공직자범죄 등에 관한 수사뿐 아니라 판사, 검사, 경무관 이상 경찰공무원 등 일부 고위공직자에 대해서는 기소까지 담당하게 되었다. 이는 검사의 기소독점주의 등 기존의 형사사법 시스템에 큰 변화를 가져오는 것인 만큼, 공수처의 법적 성격은 무엇이고, 기존 제도와 관련하여 공수처검사의 지위를 어떻게 파악해야 하는지에 관하여 여러 가지 검토가 필요하다고 생각된다. 아울러, 이와 같은 ‘새로운’ 검사의 등장은, 기존 검사제도의 의미와 그 개혁 방향에 관한 분석의 계기도 제공해 줄 것으로 보인다. 이 글에서는 이러한 문제의식을 바탕으로 공수처검사의 영장청구권 문제를 검토해 보고자 한다. 우리 헌법은 각종 영장의 청구권자를 ‘검사’로 한정하고 있다. 따라서 공수처검사의 영장청구권 문제는 헌법이 규정한 검사의 범위에 신설된 공수처검사도 포함된다고 볼 것인지의 문제이다. 이 문제에 대한 결론은 헌법이 검사에게 독점적 영장청구권을 부여한 취지, 그리고 공수처 및 공수처검사의 법적 성격 여하에 따라 달라지게 될 것이다.

신주인수권부사채 가장납입과 업무상배임죄의 성립 - 대법원 2022. 6. 30. 선고 2022도3784 판결을 중심으로 -

홍대운 강원대학교 비교법학연구소 2022 江原法學 Vol.68 No.-

Under the Korean Commercial Act, bonds with warrants, such as convertible bonds, are classified as special types of bonds that have the characteristics of both stocks and bonds. Despite the abolition of the minimum capital requirement for corporations in the Commercial Act of 2011, crimes of disguised capitalization have not been eradicated. They have continued to evolve through the use of various criminal techniques. In the so-called SillaJen case, which has become a social problem in recent years, former and current executives of SillaJen, Inc. colluded with a stock trading firm to issue bonds with warrants without actual payment of the bonds. The executives then acquired the bonds and increased their stakes by exercising the warrants. In the decision 2022Do3784 of June 30, 2022, the Korean Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of bonds with warrants by way of disguised capitalization constitutes the crime of misappropriation in violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes, instead of the crime of disguised capitalization under the Commercial Act. This judgment is the first one of its kind regarding the issuing of bonds with warrants as a fraudulent method of disguised capitalization. At the same time, it is also a judgment that clarifies the Korean Supreme Court’s decision that special bonds should be strictly separated from stocks in the case of disguised capitalization. However, given that new types of capital securities, such as perpetual bonds, continue to emerge as the line between stocks and bonds is increasingly blurred due to the development of financial techniques, the mechanical separation of stocks and bonds and the application of completely different legal standards to the issuance of stocks and bonds by disguised capitalization, all things being equal, run the risk of lacking validity in practice. Furthermore, there is no fundamental difference between the issuance of new shares by disguised capitalization and the issuance of new shares due to the exercise of warrants after the issuance of bonds with warrants by disguised capitalization. However, there may be a significant imbalance between the two cases in terms of the degree of punishment. Although the statutory criminal penalty does not change according to the amount of profit made by the perpetrators in the former case, it can be aggravated in the latter case if the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes is found to apply. In conclusion, decision 2022Do3784 can serve as an opportunity to highlight the problem of the dichotomous approach to existing precedents for stocks and bonds issued by disguised capitalization. The issuance of stocks by disguised capitalization needs to be punished as a crime of misappropriation as stipulated in the Criminal Act and the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes. 신주인수권부사채는 전환사채와 같이 주식과 사채의 성격을 모두 갖는 상법상 특수한 사채이다. 2011년 상법상 주식회사의 최저자본금 폐지에도 불구하고 가장납입은 근절되지 않고 다양한 범행수법을 활용하는 등 점점 더 진화하고 있는데, 근래 사회적으로 문제가 된 이른바 ‘신라젠 사건’에서는 신라젠의 전·현직 임직원과 인수인이 공모하여 실질적인 자금납입 없이 신주인수권부사채를 발행한 후 신주인수권을 행사하는 부정한 방법으로 지분율을 높였다. 이 사건에서 최근 대법원이 선고한 2022도3784 판결은 이러한 가장납입에 의한 신주인수권부사채 발행에 관하여 상법상 납입가장죄 대신 특정경제범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(배임)죄의 성립을 인정하였다. 이 판결은 신주인수권부사채를 가장납입에 의하여 발행한 사건에 관한 첫 판결이면서, 동시에 가장납입 사안에서는 특수한 사채라고 하더라도 주식과는 엄격히 구분하겠다는 대법원의 입장을 명확히 한 판결이기도 하다. 그러나 금융기법의 발전으로 인하여 영구채 등 신종자본증권이 계속 등장하는 등 주식과 사채의 상대화 현상이 심화되고 있다는 사실을 고려하면, 주식과 사채를 기계적으로 구분함으로써 예컨대 나머지 사실관계가 동일한 가장납입 사안에 서로 전혀 다른 법리를 적용하는 것은 실무상 구체적 타당성을 결여하게 될 위험이 있다. 또한 가장납입에 의한 신주발행과 가장납입에 의한 신주인수권부사채 발행 후 신주인수권의 행사로 인한 신주발행이 기존 주주와 회사에 끼치는 해악은 본질적인 차이가 없다. 그럼에도 불구하고 전자의 경우에 이득액에 따른 법정형의 차이가 없는 반면 후자의 경우에 특정경제범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률에 의하여 이득액이 많은 경우 가중처벌할 수 있어 결과적으로 양자 사이에 범죄와 형의 현저한 불균형이 발생할 수 있다. 따라서 2022도3784 판결은 앞서 언급한 의의 외에도 가장납입에 의한 주식과 사채발행의 죄책에 대한 기존 판례의 이분법적 접근방식의 문제점이 부각되고 공론화될 기회이기도 하며, 향후 그러한 이분법적인 접근방식을 수정하게 되는 계기가 될 수 있을 것이다.

공수처 검사의 수사범위와 영장청구권 - 대통령 내란혐의 관련 강제수사를 중심으로 -

변종필,나기업 강원대학교 비교법학연구소 2025 강원법학 Vol.78 No.-

This paper addresses the legality of the personal restraint procedures carried out under the direction of a prosecutor from the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (“CIO”) against the President of the Republic of Korea on charges of abuse of authority and rebellion between December 30, 2024, and January 19, 2025. The authors’ conclusions are as follows: i) The charge of rebellion against the President does not fall under either the category of “high-ranking official crimes” as defined in Article 2, Clause 3, or “related crimes” as defined in Article 2, Clause 4, of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials. Therefore, the CIO prosecutor lacks investigative authority in this matter. ii) Even assuming that investigative authority exists, pursuant to Article 20, Clause 1, and Article 3, Clause 1, of the same Act, a CIO prosecutor does not hold prosecutorial authority over the crime of rebellion and thus functions as a special judicial police officer rather than a prosecutor. Consequently, the CIO prosecutor cannot independently request a warrant but may only apply for a warrant request through a prosecutor at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office. Accordingly, the issuance and execution of the warrants in this case were based on an unauthorized request and are therefore unlawful. iii) Even if the issuance of the warrant is deemed lawful, the execution of the search warrant was unlawful, as the investigative authorities entered the presidential residence and arrested the President without obtaining the “consent of the person responsible,” as required by Article 110 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Consequently, the resulting detention based on this arrest is also unlawful. 2024. 12. 30.부터 2025. 1. 19.까지 전개된, 내란죄의 피의사실에 관해 고위공직자범죄수사처의 주도로 이루어진, 대한민국 대통령에 대한 인신구속(체포・수색・구속영장의 청구・발부・집행)의 적법성 문제를 다룬다. 필자의 논지는 다음과 같다. i) 대통령의 내란혐의는 「고위공직자범죄수사처 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률」 제2조 제3호의 ‘고위공직자범죄’에도, 제4호의 ‘관련범죄’에도 해당하지 않으므로, 고위공직자범죄수사처 검사에게는 수사권이 없다. ii) 설령 수사권이 있다고 하더라도, 위 법 제20조 제1항 및 제3조 제1항의 해석상 고위공직자범죄수사처 검사는 내란죄에 관해서는 검사(prosecutor)가 아니라 사법경찰관(judicial police officer)에 해당하므로, 독립하여 영장을 청구할 수 없고 단지 서울중앙지방검찰청 검사에게 영장청구를 신청할 수 있을 뿐이다. 결국 사안의 영장발부・집행은 무권한자의 청구에 기초한 것으로서 위법하다. iii) 영장발부가 적법하다고 가정하더라도, 수사기관이 형사소송법 제110조가 요구하는 ‘책임자의 승낙’ 없이 수색영장을 집행해 대통령 관저로 진입해 대통령을 체포한 것은 위법하며, 그러한 체포상태에 터잡은 구속 또한 위법하다.

고위공직자범죄수사처 검사의 영장청구권에 관한 고찰 - 헌재 2021.1.28. 선고 2020헌마264·681(병합) 결정 검토를 중심으로

유주성 한국형사법학회 2022 형사법연구 Vol.34 No.4

On December 30th in the year of 2019, the High-Ranking Officials’ Crime Investigation Agency Act passed the plenary session of the National Assembly in Korea. According to the legislation, a new institution called ‘Investigation Agency Prosecutor’ was introduced in addition to the prosecutor under the existing Prosecutors’Office Act. The investigation Agency Prosecutor is not only charged to investigate the Corruption of High-ranking public officials, but also prosecute some high-ranking public officials such as juges, prosecutors, and high-ranking police officials. Just after parliamentary passage of the bill, it was alleged that the introduction of the Right to request a warrant for the Investigation Agency Prosecutor was unconstitutional and the Right to request a warrant was only for the prosecutor under the existing Prosecutors’Office. But the Constitutional Court has ruled that the investigation Agency prosecutor is also a prosecutor who exercises the right to request the warrant. And it’s admitted that the prosecutor's right to request a warrant has institutional significance in controlling the violation of fundamental rights by the another investigative agency. This paper examines the status of the investigation agency prosecutor and the meaning of the right to request a warrant, focusing on the review of the Constitutional Court's decision. 고위공직자범죄수사처 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률(이하 “공수처법”) 제정을 통해, 공위공직자범죄등에 대한 수사권을 갖는 고위공직자범죄수사처를 설립하면서, 판사, 검사, 경무관 이상 고위공직자 등 소위 수사및사법고위직공직자 관련 관할 범죄에 대하여는 공소권도 부여하였다. 법제정 직후 헌법재판소에서는 공수처법에 대한 위헌확인을 구하는 헌법소원심판이 이루어졌는데, 수사처검사에게 영장청구권을 인정하는것이 헌법상 영장주의 원칙 위반 여부 등이 주요 쟁점이 되었다. 헌법상 영장청구권자인 검사의 범위에 검찰청법상 검사로 한정되고 따라서, 공수처법이 수사처검사로하여금 영장을 청구할 수 있도록 한 것은 그 자체로 위헌으로 국민의 신체의 자유 등기본권과 검사의 영장청구권을 침해한다는 것이 청구인 측의 주장이었다. 반면 헌법재판소는 수사처검사는 헌법에서 규정한 영장청구권을 행사는 검사가 되고, 수사처검사의 영장청구권은 수사기관에 의한 기본권 침해를 통제하는데 그 제도적 의의가 있다는 취지의 결정을 내린 바 있다. 이에 따라, 본 논문에서는 헌재 20021.1.28. 선고2020헌마264·641(병합) 결정 검토를 중심으로 수사처검사의 지위와 그에게 인정된 영장청구권의 의미를 살펴본다. 우선 수사처검사제도를 개관한 후, 대상판결에서 쟁점이 되었던 공소권이 없는 수사 관할사건에 있어 수사처검사의 지위에 관한 살펴보고 수사처검사에게 부여된 영장청구권의 실질적 의미와 그 확장해석 가능성에 관해 검토한다.

군사상 비밀장소 압수수색 제한에 관한 해석론적, 입법론적 검토

이창온 한국형사소송법학회 2025 형사소송 이론과 실무 Vol.17 No.2

형사소송법 제110조(군사상 비밀 장소 압수수색 제한)는 군사상 비밀을 요하는 장소에 대한 압수 또는 수색에 대해 책임자의 승낙을 요구하며, 책임자는 국가의 중대한 이익을 해하는 경우를 제외하고는 승낙을 거부할 수 없도록 규정하고 있다. 형사소송법 제110조 내지 제112조는 실체적 진실 발견이라는 형사절차의 이념과 군사상, 공무상, 업무상 비밀 보호라는 국가적 공익 사이의 충돌을 조율하기 위한 조항이다. 제110조 내지 제112조의 문언 체계를 고려할 때, 군사상 비밀의 보호는 공무상, 업무상 비밀 보호보다 강화되어 있으며, 특히 제110조는 군사상 비밀을 요하는 장소에 대한 수색 자체를 금지하고 있어, 제111조가 그 외 공무상 비밀에 대한 수색을 허용하고 압수만 제한하는 것과도 차이가 있다. 군사상 비밀의 보호가 강화되어 있는 것은 독일 등 해외 입법례에서도 발견되며, 입법목적상 합리성을 이해할 수 있다. 한편, 제110조가 대물수색에만 적용되고 대인수색에는 적용되지 않는다는 일부 견해는 타당하지 않다. 수색의 개념 정의상 수색의 대상에는 물건 뿐만 아니라 사람의 신체가 소재하는 장소를 포함하며, 수색영장에 대한 근거 규정인 형사소송법 제108조와 제215조가 대물수색과 대인수색을 모두 통일적으로 규율하고 있음을 고려할 때 이러한 구분론의 근거가 없다. 제138조는 구속영장 집행절차에 관한 준용 규정에 불과하며, 제110조가 상위 차원에서 법원의 수색 권한을 제한하여 형사절차의 목적과 중대한 국가법익의 조정을 담당하는 조항임을 고려할 때, 제138조가 제110조의 적용을 배제한다고 볼 수 없다. 게다가 제138조는 수색영장과 구속영장을 함께 집행하는 경우에는 적용되지 아니하며, 제219조가 제110조를 제한 없이 준용하고 있는 점을 고려할 때, 제110조의 대인수색 적용 부정설은 명백한 문언적 제약을 위반하고 있다. 압수수색 기관이 국가의 중대한 이익을 해하는 경우가 아니라고 판단한 경우 책임자가 승낙거부하더라도 압수수색이 가능한지 여부에 관하여 학설이 대립하나, 현행법의 문언상 제110조는 국가의 중대한 이익을 해하지 않는 경우를 제112조와 같은 압수수색의 예외적 허용 사유가 아니라 승낙 거부의 제한사유로만 규정하고 있고, 군사상 비밀 장소에 대해서는 수색 자체가 금지되어 법원이나 압수수색 집행기관이 그 비밀의 내용을 미리 알기도 어려우므로, 책임자의 승낙 없이도 압수 또는 수색할 수 있다고 해석하는 것은 허용되기 어렵다. 입법론적으로는 미국과 유사하게, 피고인의 방어권 보장을 위한 재판절차의 비밀관리 제도를 마련할 필요가 있다. 현행법상 제110조는 피고인의 방어권 보호 관점이 누락하고 있기 때문이다. 또한 독일처럼 압수를 위한 법원 제출명령의 활용, 수색영장의 군사기관에 대한 집행위탁 등 조화로운 강제처분 활용하여 중대한 국가비밀 보호와 사법적 이익 사이의 조화를 달성하기 위한 다른 방안들을 모색할 필요가 있다. 중대한 국가비밀의 판단 주체를 사법기관이 아니라 행정관청으로 두는 현행법과 일본식 모델이 입법정책상 부당하다고 단정하기는 어려우나, 피고인의 방어권 보장이라는 중요한 가치와 조화될 수 있는 방안과 행정관청의 권한남용을 합리적으로 제한하는 방안을 마련하는 것이 중요하다. Article 110 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which governs the restriction on seizure and search of places requiring military secrecy, stipulates that the consent of the person in charge is required for seizure or search of such places. But it states that the person in charge can not refuse consent unless it significantly harms the important national interest. Articles 110 to 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act are provisions designed to reconcile the ideal of discovering the substantive truth in criminal proceedings with the public interest of protecting military, public official and private entrusted secrets. Considering the textual structure of Articles 110 to 112, the protection of military secrecy is more emphasized than the protection of public official or private entrusted secrets. In particular, Article 110 prohibits the search itself of places requiring military secrecy, distinguishing it from Article 111, which permits searches for other public official secrets while only restricting seizure. This enhanced protection for military secrets is also found in foreign legislative examples, such as Germany, and can be understood as having a rational legislative purpose. Some argue that Article 110 only applies to material searches and not to personal searches. However, this view is not plausible. By definition, the object of a search includes not only objects but also places where a person's body is located. Considering that Articles 108 and 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which are the basis for search warrants, uniformly regulate both material and personal searches, there is no basis for such a distinction. Article 138 is merely a provision for the application mutatis mutandis of procedures for executing arrest warrants. Given that Article 110 restricts the court's search authority at a higher level and serves to balance the purpose of criminal proceedings with significant national secrecy interests, Article 138 can not be seen as excluding the application of Article 110. Furthermore, Article 138 does not apply when search warrants and arrest warrants are executed together. Considering that Article 219 applies Article 110 without limitation, the argument that Article 110 does not apply to personal searches clearly violates textual constraints. Regarding whether seizure or search is possible if the person in charge refuses consent, even if the seizing and searching agency determines that it does not significantly harm the national secrecy interests, academic opinions differ. However, according to the current text of Article 110, the phrase "unless it significantly harms the important national interests" is stipulated only as a ground for restricting the refusal of consent, not as an exceptional ground for permitting seizure or search, as in Article 112. Since it is difficult for the court or the executing agency to know the content of military secrets in advance, interpreting that seizure or search is possible without the consent of the person in charge is difficult to accept. From a legislative perspective, it is necessary to establish a secret management system for trial procedures to ensure the defendant's right to defense, similar to the approach in the United States. This is because the current Article 110 omits the perspective of protecting the defendant's right to defense. Furthermore, it is necessary to explore other methods to achieve harmony between protecting significant national secrets and judicial interests, such as utilizing court orders for submission for seizure and entrusting the execution of search warrants to military agencies, as done in Germany. While it is difficult to definitively conclude that the current law and the Japanese model, which designate administrative agencies rather than judicial bodies as the arbiters of significant national secrets, are legislatively unreasonable, it is crucial to devise measures that can harmonize with the important value of protecting the defendan...

자본시장법상 조사 제도의 형사법적 문제점

이근우 ( Keun Woo Lee ) 안암법학회 2013 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.40

There is a unique administrative investigation system in the former Securities and Exchange Act and Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Acts. These acts enact a provision that public officials specified by Presidential Decree (hereinafter referred to as "investigative officials") among those who work for the Financial Services Commission to interrogate the suspect involved in such as violation, seize goods, or search a place of business, etc. The general seizure and search are banned from Korean criminal law, a warrant of seizure or of search shall be issued in cases where a seizure or search is to be affected and shall be executed by a judicial police official under the direction of a public prosecutors. In other words the seizure and search are exceptional constraint disposition. The investigative officials are not the position of special judicial police in Act on the Persons Performing the Duties of Judicial Police Officials and the Scope of their Duties. But the provision includes they can carry out constraint disposition. The problem of an administrative investigation of investigative officials is clear, of course, it is actually vastly underutilized as yet. On the other hand, the proposal to enable this system is coming. This article pointed out the problems of criminal law according to the investigations of the investigation officials who doesn`t have policed powers and proposed an alternative to forced investigative authority of administrative agencies.

고위공직자범죄수사처 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률의 해석상 쟁점에 관한 연구

김기갑,김상운 한국문화융합학회 2021 문화와 융합 Vol.43 No.1

On July 15, 2020, the law on the establishment and operation of high-ranking public officials’ criminal investigation office was enacted, but the launch of the investigation office is drifting because it can not form a nomination committee for the investigation chief due to the political confrontation between ruling party and opposition party. Unconstitutional legal proceedings are also underway under the premise that the investigation office, which has been difficult to find in the public disappointment about the neutrality and fairness of the exercise of powerful prosecution power, has no constitutional basis. Some say that it is administrative and budget waste to create a separate investigative agency, but considering the political adherence shown in the investigation of the prosecution’s lawmakers, ministers, vice ministers, judges, and prosecutors, there is no need to say that an independent investigative agency is needed from legislation, justice and administration. Therefore, this study examined whether the investigation office is unconstitutional because there is no constitutional basis, and analyzed the legal interpretation problems and suggested alternatives so that the investigation office can become a more neutral investigation agency on the premise of the necessity of the investigation office.

明代 前期 外國 使節의 身分證明 方式과 國家間 體系

정동훈 명청사학회 2013 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.40

This paper basically examines the types of travel and identification documents for official foreign envoys at the Chinese borders and the principles of the international order that the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) tried to establish in East Asia. This research further defines and illustrates the term so-called ‘inter-state system’ in East Asia between the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. After the foundation of the Ming dynasty, frequent visits of foreign delegations gradually became a political and financial burden to the Ming court. Consequently, the Chinese court decided to impose a strict sea blockade and allow only the official tributary envoys to set foot on Chinese soil. When the foreign envoys arrived at the border, they had to prove that they were officially sent by their country. There were several kinds of credentials used when they went through the entry procedure such as tally, part of official seal or documentation, called kamhap (勘合), to be matched with another part of the seal or document for authenticity (for envoys from Japan and Southeast Asia) or an imperial warrant, called kongch’ik (貢勅), issued by the Ming court (for envoys from Mongol and Jurchen tribal groups) or an official warrant, called ch’ach’a (差箚), issued by the Chosǒn court (for Korean envoys). There were only fifteen states which received the official identification kamhap from Ming China. The rulers of these foreign states also all commonly received a Chinese investiture. That is, the Ming court guaranteed the rulers of the selected neighboring states not only political authority but also economic interests by granting exclusive rights to monopolize trade with China. On the other hand, the rulers were obligated to control and intercept illegal diplomatic and trade activities within their territory. In other words, as the Ming court could not directly intervene in all of the neighboring regions, they selected some subordinate partner states and granted them a political and economic privilege, as well as a duty to maintain stable international order. Ming China accepted the diplomatic travel documents issued by the Chosǒn court unlike other foreign states. It was because China shared the same writing and document management systems with Korea. The Chosǒn also never pursued economic interests in their relationship with Ming China. Additionally, the Chosǒn court was strong enough to prevent any problem of diplomatic imposters (wisa, 僞使) and fabricate Chosǒn diplomatic credentials. More significantly, Chosǒn was seen as a model and ideal foreign state by Ming China based on these distinguishing points. Ming China wanted to establish the ‘states’ ruled by kings in their surrounding regions and admitted the selected polities—only in the form of state—as their negotiation partner. With a Chinese investiture and official travel and identification documents, the Ming granted the selected neighboring states exclusive rights and imposed duties on them at the same time in their relationship with China. After all, the Ming court and the rulers of such recognized foreign states could only become the main agents of negotiation between the states in East Asia. Ultimately, this paper brings the term ‘inter-state system’ to describe the characteristics of Ming China’s foreign relationship with neighboring states, as well as the uniqueness of the Chosǒn dynasty in the ‘inter-state system’ in East Asia. These are all the central propositions to which this paper is devoted.